The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model

Abstract

In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual and hypothetical conditionals that can exhibit different “degrees of contingency”. We use this idea to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, this structure explains why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so successful in scientific practice. For illustrative purposes, we provide an example from population genetics, the Wright-Fisher Model.

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2012-02-22

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Alfonso Arroyo-Santos
National Autonomous University of Mexico

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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Critical scientific realism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247.

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