What can we do? Collective ability, and co-agential capacity

Philosophical Studies:1-21 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

I address the question of whether non-agential groups can have agential powers, or abilities and propose a new analysis of group agential powers. In this paper I provide a plausible counter-example to the claim that the only groups of agents that can have agential powers are collective agents, and discuss other, weaker conditions which a groups of agents must satisfy in order to have agential powers. In particular, I introduce a notion which I call ‘co-agential attunement’ and provide an analysis of group agential powers on which a group’s members must be capable of becoming co-agentially attuned in order to have agential powers. Some non-agential groups meet this condition: a group’s members having the mere capacity for co-agential attunement does not make the group a collective agent.

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Bill Wringe
Bilkent University

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References found in this work

Group agency: the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Philip Pettit.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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