Invariance Applied

In Causation with a Human Face: Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 271-312 (2021)
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Abstract

This chapter applies the ideas about invariance from Chapter 5 to the analysis (both normative and descriptive) of various aspects of commonsense cause reasoning. The focus is mainly on one particular kind of invariance—invariance under changes in background conditions, here called insensitivity. This is used to cast light on causal judgments involving omissions and examples involving double prevention (in which the occurrence of _c_ prevents the occurrence of _e_, which had it occurred, would have prevented the occurrence of _f_, with the result that _f_ occurs). It is argued that causal claims regarding omissions and double prevention relations differ normatively depending on the invariance of the relations involved and that this is also reflected in the judgments that people make about such claims.

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References found in this work

Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Two concepts of causation.Ned Hall - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul, Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 225-276.

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