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Data and phenomena: a restatement and defense
Synthese 182 (1):165-179 (2011)
Abstract
This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Open Systems View.Michael E. Cuffaro & Stephan Hartmann - 2024 - Philosophy of Physics 2 (1):6:1-27.
Creativity and Practical Underdetermination: How Experimental Science Steps into the Epistemic Adjacent Possible.Andrew Bollhagen - 2025 - Biological Theory 2025.
How Theory-Laden Are Observations of Black Holes?Juliusz Doboszewski & Jamee Elder - 2025 - Philosophy of Science 92 (4):827-849.
References found in this work
Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science.Ian Hacking - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress.Hasok Chang - 2004 - New York, US: OUP Usa.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):381-390.
Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
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