Who’s on first?

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15 (2020)
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Abstract

“X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we aren’t X-Firsters. Hence the chapter’s two main goals. First, to provide a simple argument that one shouldn’t be an X-Firster about the normative domain, which starts with the observation that analogous views have dubious merits in analogous domains. Second, to offer an alternative view—taking normativity to be a determinable explained in terms of its determinates—that offers an interesting way to think about the structure and unity of normativity.

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reprint Wodak, Daniel (2020) "Who’s on First?". In Shafer-Landau, Russ, Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15, pp. 49-71: Oxford University Press (2020)

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Daniel Wodak
University of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

Ground by Law.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):279-301.
The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.
Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.

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References found in this work

Slaves of the passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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