The Epistemic Condition

In Philip Robichaud & Jan Wieland, Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2017)
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Abstract

This introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In sect. 1, we discuss the main concepts ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. In sect. 2, we ask why agents should inform themselves. In sect. 3, we describe what we take to be the core agreement among main participants in the debate. In sect. 4, we explain how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. In sect. 5, we provide an overview of the main responses to the regress argument. In sect. 6, we address the question why blameless ignorance excuses. In sect. 7, we describe further issues that are addressed in the book. In sect. 8, we conclude with some discussion of future directions the debate might take.

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Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam

References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1963 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Two faces of responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227–48.
Who Knew?George Sher - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

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