Abstract

Chapter 14 is an epilogue—a sketch of how the author’s theory of rational belief can address the remaining great questions of epistemology. First, this theory can give an account of the significance of _inference_—including _non-deductive_ inference as well as deductive inference; it can also explain how non-deductive inferences are _defeasible_—allowing for a version of the distinction between “rebutting” and “undercutting” defeaters. Secondly, the theory can give an account of the significance of beliefs—like perceptual beliefs—that endorse the contents of non-doxastic mental states like _sensory experiences_ and _episodic memories_. Thirdly, the theory can be developed to explain what is wrong with the most challenging arguments for _radical scepticism_. Finally, the theory can be developed to give an analysis of _knowledge_—what has elsewhere been called the “internalist virtue theory of knowledge”.