Abstract

This is the Introduction to the book—the goal of which it is to present a general theory of rational belief. This book is a sequel to the author’s previous book, _The Value of Rationality_ (Oxford University Press, 2017). It aims to take the general conception of rationality that was developed in that earlier book, and to combine this conception with an account of the nature of belief, to yield an account of what it is for beliefs to count as rational. The central idea of this general conception of rationality is that rational thinking gives the thinker “good news” about this thinking’s degree of correctness—while the more irrational one’s thinking is, the worse the news that it gives one about its degree of correctness. A brief account is given of some of the epistemological questions that the book is designed to address. Then, after some comments on the methodological issues that any book on this subject must confront, the overall plan of the book is outlined. Finally, some of the limits of this project are discussed: in particular, despite the enormous importance of social epistemology, the focus of this book will be on what it is for an individual’s beliefs to count as rational.