Abstract

Chapter 6 takes up the topic of full or outright belief. What is puzzling about full belief is that its functional role seems to be that of treating the believed proposition as if it were _certain_, and yet it also seems possible to have a full belief in propositions of which we are _not_ absolutely certain. The solution to the puzzle lies in seeing that in addition to our _theoretical_ credences—beliefs of the kind whose role is, to put it roughly, to gauge how strongly the relevant proposition is supported by one’s “evidence”—there are also _practical_ credences—beliefs of the kind whose role is to guide us in action and practical decision making. It is argued that, for limited finite believers like us, it is unavoidable that we will sometimes act on practical credences that are different from our theoretical credences. To have a full or outright belief in a proposition can be plausibly identified with being disposed to treat the proposition as _practically_ certain, for all _normal_ practical purposes.