Correct Belief

In Rationality and Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 149-167 (2023)
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Abstract

Chapter 7 turns to the question of the standard of _correctness_ for beliefs, beginning with the case of believing propositions with certainty. It is argued that, if you have such a belief, this belief is correct if and only if the proposition believed is _true_. We can represent this by giving each belief of this kind in a true proposition an incorrectness score of 0 (it is not incorrect at all), and each belief of this kind in a false proposition an incorrectness score of 1 (it is completely incorrect). Then, in comparing two or more alternative systems of such beliefs that are defined over the same set of propositions, the way to measure the degree to which each system is incorrect is simply by a _weighted sum_ of the incorrectness scores that the belief system gets for each proposition. The consequences of this idea are explained, and the idea is defended against a number of objections—including objections that are due to Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, and Selim Berker, among others.

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Ralph Wedgwood
University of Southern California

References found in this work

The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.

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