Abstract

This dissertation aims to clarify and evaluate early Heidegger's argument that traditional philosophy has fallen victim to an intellectualistic fallacy because it overlooks the fact that human beings are not merely knowers, but also historically rooted, willing agents. The argument at issue purports to show that 'care' and 'concern' are central to a proper philosophical understanding of knowledge, truth and experience. ;I begin with a detailed analysis of two key terms in Heidegger's argument, 'readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-at-hand,' in order to show that their meaning and relation have not been properly worked out. The former term must be construed not technically, but in its full-blown relation to the sphere of praxis. I then attempt to explain the 'deficiency' of presence-at-hand by going beyond Heidegger's own explanation. The result is a triadic relation whereby theory and practice are grounded, in different ways, in the same unitary structure--a structure which is itself practical. ;I then reconstruct Heidegger's argument for the priority of the practical. The argument is shown to consist of two distinct claims: first, for the priority of readiness-to-hand and the everyday world to theoretical inquiry; second, for the priority of praxis as a condition for the possibility of human experience as we know it. The argument, combining these two claims, is shown to a be a strategy relying partly on a 'non-legitimating transcendental argument' and partly on certain assumptions about human nature. It is shown that this argument leads to a purportedly non-skeptical version of historical relativism. The consistency of Heidegger's relativism is then examined. ;In the final part, I assess the degree to which Heidegger's argument and position succeeds as a critique of intellectualistic theories of experience. I argue that his strategy is successful only if we interpret it as making the claim that theoretical inquiry is shaped by everyday experience. It is then shown that Heidegger is able to formulate a unique and engaging anti-scientistic, anti-skeptical and anti-realist philosophical position