Socially Embedded Agency: Lesssons from Marginalized Identities

In David Shoemaker, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-129 (2021)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a distinctive kind of agency that can vindicate the agency of members of marginalised groups while accommodating the autonomy-undermining influences of oppression. Socially-embedded agency—the locus of which is in the exercise of our ability to negotiate between different social features—is compatible with, and can explain, various phenomena, including double-consciousness and white fragility. Moreover, although socially-embedded agency is neither necessary nor sufficient for autonomy, exercising it is practically necessary for autonomy, at least for members of marginalised groups in our non-ideal world.

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Aness Kim Webster
Durham University

Citations of this work

Epistemische Ungerechtigkeiten.Hilkje Charlotte Hänel - 2024 - Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
Theorizing Non-Ideal Agency.Caleb Ward - 2024 - In Hilkje Charlotte Hänel & Johanna M. Müller, The Routledge Handbook of Non-Ideal Theory. New York, NY: Routledge.
Resisting Social Categories.Sara Bernstein - 2024 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 8:81-102.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The social construction of what?Ian Hacking - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Timothy Schroeder.

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