Semantics for Reasons

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Edited by Kevin Scharp (2019)
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Abstract

Semantics for Reasons is a book about what we mean when we talk about reasons. It not only brings together the theory of reasons and natural language semantics in original ways but also sketches out a litany of implications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. In their account of how the language of reasons works, Bryan R. Weaver and Kevin Scharp propose and defend a view called Question Under Discussion Reasons Contextualism. They use this view to argue for a series of novel positions on the ontology of reasons, indexical facts, the reasons-to-be-rational debate, moral reasons, and the reasons-first approach.

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Author Profiles

Bryan R. Weaver
Ohio State University
Kevin Scharp
University of Twente

Citations of this work

“Reason” En Masse.Eliot Watkins - 2025 - Philosophical Perspectives 38 (1):222-236.
Philosophy as the Study of Defective Concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett, Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 396-416.
Subtracting Reasons in Normative Domains.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2023 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 37 (1):139-163.

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