Abstract

In this paper, I describe how the transmission of understanding might mirror that of culture and be regulated by delayed epistemic vigilance. To do as much, I consider how the problem is usually framed. There is conflicting evidence on whether understanding can be gained by transmission, with most authors believing that it can be encouraged but not transmitted and some—like Boyd, Grimm and Malfatti—showing some compelling examples of understanding via testimony. I isolate six arguments against the possibility of transmission and then introduce in the debate the notions of imitation and transformation via cultural attraction, core notions in the analysis of preservative and transformative accounts of cultural transmission. I explain the role of delayed epistemic vigilance, i.e. mechanisms which allow agents to distribute the cognitive load of transmission processes within a community. In linking these notions, I show that the transmission process is not as unified as usually described. I argue that it is a process composed of three stages, each of which has features which motivate the various intuitions regarding the transmission of understanding. I conclude that, given a more nuanced analysis of this kind, it can be argued understanding can indeed be transmitted.