Readiness Potentials Do Not Cause Our Actions

Abstract

This article argues against Benjamin Libet's claim that his experiment has shown that our actions are caused by brain events which begin before we consciously undertake the action. It clarifies what exactly should be meant by saying that the readiness potential causes, initiates, or prepares an action. It shows why Libet's experiment does not support his claim and why the experiments by Herrmann et al. and by Trevena \& Miller provide evidence against it. The empirical evidence is compatible with strong libertarian free will. Neither the readiness potential nor the lateralized readiness potential cause our actions.

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Daniel von Wachter
International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein

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References found in this work

[no title].Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Do we have free will?Benjamin W. Libet - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):47-57.
The Evolution of the Soul.Richard Swinburne - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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