A Syncretistic Theory of Proper Names

In Andrea Bianchi, Vittorio Morato & Giuseppe Spolaore, The importance of being Ernesto: Reference, truth and logical form. Padova: Padova University Press. pp. 141-164 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper, I want to show that, far from being incompatible, a Predicate Theory of proper names and the Direct Reference thesis can be combined in a syncretistic account. There are at least three plausible such accounts – one which compares proper names in their referential use to referentially used proper definite descriptions, another one that compares them in this use to demonstratives, and a third one which, although it is as indexicalist as the second one, conceives proper names in this use as a sui generis form of indexicals, indexinames. Finally, I will try to give both technical and substantive reasons as to why the third account is to be preferred to the other two.

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Alberto Voltolini
University of Turin

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References found in this work

Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson, The logic of grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co.. pp. 64-75.
Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Belief De Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.
Reference and proper names.Tyler Burge - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):425-439.
Demonstratives.Palle Yourgrau (ed.) - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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