Abstract

ABSTRACT I want to hold an original position as regards the metaphysics of mythical entities, a kind of fictional entities that, typically at least, are not recognised as such by their purported authors, for they entertain no relevant act of make-believe. This position is weak mythical creationism, which lies between straightforward mythical creationism, the position holding that all mythical entities are on a par by being created by their purported authors (Braun, David. 2005. “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names.” Noûs 39: 596–631; Salmon, Nathan. 2002. “Mythical Objects.” In Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by J. K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, 105–123. New York: Seven Bridges Press; Zvolenszky, Zsofia. 2016. “Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation.” Res Philosophica 93: 311–333), and mythical anticreationism, for which mythical entities are no artefactual creations (Goodman, Jeffrey. 2014. “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth.” Analysis 74: 35–40; Goodman, Jeffrey. 2017. “On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, and Scientific Hypothesizing.” Res Philosophica 94: 177–188). According to weak mythical creationism, one must draw a distinction between standard and nonstandard mythical entities, i.e. legendary entities and post-empirical posits. For unlike legendary entities, a post-empirical posit is an artefact created only later by an audience. Thus, weak creationism rejects the form of mythical backward-looking creationism that straightforward mythical creationism entails: namely, the idea that the merely purported authors of post-empirical posits are nevertheless their original creators.