Consciousness: Philosophy’s Great White Whale

In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner, The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 105-122 (2021)
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Abstract

On the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is real, and ruling out Cartesian isolation from the non-mental world, we have two choices for its introduction: either it comes about in the course of the development of the non-conscious realm or it was there from the beginning. The latter comprises versions of panpsychism, a recently trending view in some quarters. In their view the former are broadly taken to be versions of emergentism, embracing even non-eliminatiivist materialisms. After producing what seem to me to be powerful objections to panpsychism, I defend emergentism against pansychist attacks on it. As I explain, my version is also dualist. Finally, with respect to both outlooks I briefly review the prospects of a rapidly advancing AI for expanding the current population of natural mental subjects.

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Gerald Vision
Temple University

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