Anscombe, la expresión de autoconciencia y la regla de autorreferencia

Revista de filosofía (Chile) 68:133-154 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

“The First Person” is the paper where G. E. M. Anscombe supports the thesis that “I” is not a referring word. Mainly I deal with her argument against the indexical view of “I” from the scenario of the “A” user, who refers to himself as the person who is under the special observation of the “A” user. On the one hand, I put forward that a use of “A” might have a guaranteed reference in a semantic sense: a referential use of “A” as a definite description guarantees the one reference to oneself. On the other hand, the indexical view is left untouched: the reference of “A” is not fixed by the self-reference rule, and thus “I” and “A” are not indistinguishable referring words. Also I explore the idea that unlike “A”, “I” has a guaranteed reference in an epistemic sense, being immune to error through misidentification

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-24

Downloads
63 (#953,609)

6 months
16 (#751,944)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by John McDowell.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (19):555-67.

View all 14 references / Add more references