Abstract

This contribution examines the tension between an institution, the market, and a value, justice, in the context of liberal democratic societies. It starts from the critique of the expansion of the market beyond its economic function, which generates negative externalities that affect not only equity but also shared moral bonds and nor-ms. Within this framework, it analyzes Friedrich Hayek’s conception of spontaneous order and formal justice, which denies the possibility of attributing responsibility to, or of qualifying as fair or unfair, market outcomes. In contrast, it revisits Adam Smith’s proposal, for whom justice cannot be separated from the moral judgment of agents, anchored in principles such as sympathy and the impartial spectator. Finally, Michael Sandel’s critique of the commodification of life is used to show how this moral erosion requires an ethical reinterpretation of the market. The thesis defended is that acting justly implies taking responsibility for the effects our actions have on others; therefore, a just society cannot be sustained on the presumed moral neutrality of the market.