Existential Nihilism: The Only Really Serious Problem in Philosophy

Journal of Camus Studies 2018:211-232 (2018)
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Abstract

Since Friedrich Nietzsche, philosophers have grappled with the question of how to respond to nihilism. Nihilism, often seen as a derogative term for a ‘life-denying’, destructive and perhaps most of all depressive philosophy is what drove existentialists to write about the right response to a meaningless universe devoid of purpose. This latter diagnosis is what I shall refer to as existential nihilism, the denial of meaning and purpose, a view that not only existentialists but also a long line of philosophers in the empiricist tradition ascribe to. The absurd stems from the fact that though life is without meaning and the universe devoid of purpose, man still longs for meaning, significance and purpose. Inspired by Bojack Horseman and Rick and Morty, two modern existentialist masterpieces, this paper explores the various alternatives that have been offered in how to respond to the absurd, or as Albert Camus puts it; the only “really serious philosophical problem” and concludes that the problem is compatible with a naturalistic world-view, thereby genuine and transcending existentialism.

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Walter Veit
University of Reading

Citations of this work

Reclaiming Moral Nihilism.Walter Veit - 2022 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid):1-17.

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References found in this work

The absurd.Thomas Nagel - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (20):716-727.
Nihilism.Richard Joyce - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

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