Abstract

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.