Of Birds and Reptiles (And Fish)

In Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 121-133 (2016)
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Abstract

This chapter bolsters the conclusion drawn in the previous chapter by looking at the case of birds and lizards. Like fish, birds have no neocortex. Interestingly, they have a brain region that is a homologue of the neocortex, however. This region––the dorsal ventricular ridge––supports experiences in birds, or so it is argued. And fish, it has recently been hypothesized, have a similar brain region too. By applying the framework developed in earlier chapters, it is argued that it is rational to prefer the hypothesis that birds, reptiles, and fish have experiences to the hypothesis that they do not.

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