A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character

Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39 (1995)
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The Nature of Pain and the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Michael Tye - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman, Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 298-321.

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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
What makes pains unpleasant?D. T. Bain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel, The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization.Matthias Michel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2411-2428.

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