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Contingent weighting in judgment and choice
Psychological Review 95 (3):371-384 (1988)
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Citations of this work
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
The priority heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs.Eduard Brandstätter, Gerd Gigerenzer & Ralph Hertwig - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (2):409-432.
Nonconsequentialist decisions.Jonathan Baron - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):1-10. Translated by Jonathan Baron.
New paradoxes of risky decision making.Michael H. Birnbaum - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (2):463-501.
Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices.Simon Gächter, Eric J. Johnson & Andreas Herrmann - 2021 - Theory and Decision 92 (3):599-624.
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