Ostrich presentism

Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ostrich presentists maintain that we can use all the expressive resources of the tensed language to provide an explanation of why true claims about the past are true, without thereby paying any price in terms of ontology or basic ideology. I clarify the position by making a distinction between three kinds of explanation, which has general interest and applicability. I then criticize the ostrich position because it requires an unconstrained version of the third form of explanation, which is out of place in metaphysics

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-09-29

Downloads
1,039 (#51,923)

6 months
185 (#66,550)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Giuliano Torrengo
Università degli Studi di Milano

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder, Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.

View all 85 references / Add more references