Abstract

In global health, several practices rely on the assumption that death has a disvalue for those who die. This includes the fact that we prioritize extending human lives rather than creating new ones, the combination Y_ears Lived with Disability_ (YLD) and _Years of Life Lost_ (YLL) into _Disability-Adjusted Life Years_ (DALYs), as well as managing the trade-off between morbidity and mortality reduction in a health priority setting. According to Epicureanism, however, death cannot have any disvalue for those who die. Three main arguments are offered on behalf of Epicureanism: the view that we cannot experience death (the experience argument), the view that there is no time where death harms us (the time argument), and the view that there is a symmetry between the nonexistence before and after our lives (the symmetry argument). I show that all three arguments fail to convince.