Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason

Informal Logic 26 (3):341-357 (2006)
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Abstract

In a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have to rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these concerns by way of considering what benefits Perelman’s work can have for informal logic, and what insights the work of informal logicians might bring to the project of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

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Christopher Tindale
University of Windsor