Brentano on inner consciousness

Dialectica 60 (4):411-432 (2006)
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Abstract

I offer a reconstruction of Brentano's view of inner consciousness and show how Brentano prevented a regress of higher-order mental acts

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Mark Textor
King's College London

References found in this work

Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 1785 - University Park, Pa.: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derek R. Brookes & Knud Haakonssen.
Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (11):649-63.
A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.

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