Norms of Truth and Logical Revision

Topoi 34 (1):15-23 (2015)
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Abstract

Many take the lesson of the paradoxes to be that we ought to impose some form of logical revision. It is argued here that this kind of move should not be taken lightly.

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2014-07-11

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Giulia Terzian
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Citations of this work

One Step is Enough.David Ripley - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6):1-27.
One Step is Enough.David Ripley - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6):1233-1259.
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions.Edson Bezerra - 2023 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 27 (3):519-538.
Logics of Truth and Maximality.Johannes Stern - 2025 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (2):337-355.
Sets, lies, and analogy: a new methodological take.Giulia Terzian - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2759-2784.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Saving truth from paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.

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