Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections

Theoria 80 (4):211-221 (2014)
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Abstract

Ross Cameron puts forward a novel solution to the truthmaker problem facing presentism. I claim that, by Cameron's own lights, the view is not in fact a presentist view at all, but rather requires us to endorse a form of Priority Presentism, whereby past objects are derivative and depend for their existence upon present objects. I argue that this view should be rejected

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reprint Tallant, Jonathan (2015) "Presentism, Truthmaking and Necessary Connections". Theoria 81(3):211-221

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Jonathan Tallant
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Hard presentism.Patrick Dawson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8433-8461.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.

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