Abstract

It is a central tenet of much contemporary liberal theory that the state should remain as far as possible neutral between rival conceptions of the good life. By contrast, perfectionists hold that one function of the state is to encourage citizens to lead good or flourishing ways of life. But perfectionists have not generally been clear about whether they take perfectionist interventions to be permissible or mandatory. This chapter argues in favour of the stronger duty-based version of perfectionism. After introducing the distinction between duty-based and non-duty-based forms of perfectionism (Section 1), it makes a case for duty-based perfectionism by defending the idea of a right to the fair conditions of a flourishing life (Section 2). It then shows how the invocation of perfectionist duties can help perfectionists to rebut a number of powerful objections that have recently been levelled against their view (3). Finally, it defends duty-based perfectionism against the charge that it violates the public justification principle (Section 4).