Abstract

The sciences frequently endorse generalizations that hold only ceteris paribus—“all else being equal” or “excluding all interfering factors”—raising the challenge of explicating such clauses. On the one hand, they risk reducing generalizations to empty tautologies, asserting that F is G when F is G. On the other hand, removing the clause renders the generalizations false. This challenge, known as Lange’s dilemma, is addressed in this paper through an evidentialist theory of epistemic justification. The solution argues that the proper scope and content of generalizations are determined by the evidence from which they arise. This evidentialist account not only resolves the dilemma but also unifies and explains alternative solutions proposed in the literature. In addition, by prioritizing the evidential basis (matter) of generalizations over their linguistic formulation (form), this framework aligns with broader trends in the philosophy of science, advocating for a research program that explicitly and self-consciously embraces a non-formal approach for understanding scientific reasoning.