Concepts and properties or predication and copulation

Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149):402-406 (1987)
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Abstract

Wiggins recently proposed construing frege's 'unsaturated expressions' as containing two elements, Viz., (1) a copula and (2) a general term standing for a concept; but he argued that concepts, So understood, Were not to be identified with properties. While accepting the above division of 'unsaturated expressions', I argue, Contra wiggins, That concepts, So understood, Were precisely to be identified with properties

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