Abstract

According to exceptionalism about logic, logic is special, it enjoys a privileged position among the sciences, its method is not the method of the natural sciences, and the knowledge it provides is different in kind from the knowledge provided by the natural sciences. According to anti-exceptionalism about logic, instead, logic isn’t special, its method is continuous with the method of the natural sciences, logical theories are revisable, and when they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds on which scientific theories are revised. The heuristic view of logic can be regarded as an anti-exceptionalist stance on logic since it too conceives of logic as continuous with the natural sciences. Nevertheless, there are at least two main differences between the heuristic view of logic and standard formulations of anti-exceptionalism about logic: 1) anti-exceptionalists share with exceptionalists the idea that logic is the study of logical consequence, while according to the heuristic view of logic, logic should be understood as a logic of discovery; 2) anti-exceptionalists usually claim that the method of logic is abductive, while according to the heuristic view of logic the method of logic is not abductive. It will be argued that the heuristic view of logic provides a more adequate anti-exceptionalist view on logic than standard formulations of anti-exceptionalism about logic.