Sexual Ontology and Group Marriage

Philosophy 58 (224):215 - 227 (1983)
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Abstract

Philosophers of earlier ages have usually spent time in considering thenature of marital, and in general familial, duty. Paley devotes an entire book to those ‘relative duties which result from the constitution of the sexes’,1 a book notable on the one hand for its humanity and on the other for Paley‘s strange refusal to acknowledge that the evils for which he condemns any breach of pure monogamy are in large part the result of the fact that such breaches are generally condemned. In a society where an unmarried mother is ruined no decent male should put a woman in such danger: but why precisely should social feeling be so severe? Marriage, the monogamist would say, must be defended at all costs, for it is a centrally important institution of our society. Political community was, in the past, understood as emerging from or imposed upon families, or similar associations. The struggle to establish the state was a struggle against families, clans and clubs; the state, once established, rested upon the social institutions to which it gave legal backing.

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Stephen R. L. Clark
University of Liverpool

Citations of this work

III. Morals, Moore, and maclntyre.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):425 – 445.
The politics of ethology.Daniel A. Dombrowski - 1994 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 8 (3):359-369.

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