Abstract

The aim of this paper is to bring out the core theoretical commitments underlying Kojève’s reading of Kant, to display the conceptual operations he puts in place in his engagement with Kant’s thought, and to outline the strategic function the reference to Kant possesses within Kojève’s overall project. I will argue that Kojève’s appraisal of Kant oscillates between two positions difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, Kojève views Kant as a forerunner of his own ontologically dualistic approach. On this reading, Kant’s philosophy—once purged of the notion of the thing-in-itself—can function as a corrective to Hegel’s “monistic error” and point the way towards a dualistic ontology. On the other hand, Kojève reads Kant as perpetuating a form of a dualism characteristic of the “theistic attitude” which introduces a split separating the subject from the in-itself and thus blocks any possibility of attaining an inner-worldly satisfaction. It is the tension between these two forms of dualism—a still incomplete, theistic dualism and a consistently unfolded, atheistic dualism—that, on Kojève’s account, is characteristic of Kant’s philosophical stance. To unpack these massive claims, I will first expose the way in which Kojève delineates the overall shape of Kant’s system. Then, I will trace the lineaments of his understanding of the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself. Finally, I will expose Kojève’s criticism of Kant’s practical philosophy and, more specifically, of his understanding of human freedom.