Abstract

In this paper we will examine a number of G.E.M. Anscombe’s claims about the human person after death in light of the practices of praying to and for the pre-resurrected dead. In particular, we will look at whether these practices commit one to weighty ontological beliefs. In order to evaluate the costs and benefits of Anscombe’s claims, we will weigh them against competing claims from other theories. In section 1, we will describe a number of views about the human person, noting whether they face difficulties, either in general or in relation to certain practices of prayer. In section 2, we turn to Anscombe’s theory itself, describing both her claims about the disembodied soul and the relation of these claims to the practices of prayer. In section 3, we will discuss the costs and benefits of this approach. In particular, we will note that Anscombe’s view has the benefit of avoiding the theoretical difficulties that plague each of the other views we discuss. We will argue, however, that there is also a great cost to her theory for Catholics: Her view would undermine the practices of praying to and for the dead for many of their participants.