Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions

Analysis 65 (2):126-131 (2005)
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Abstract

Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.

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10.1093/analys/65.2.126

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Jason Stanley
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

New Work For Certainty.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8).
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.

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References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith Derose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.

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