Abstract

Anton Friedrich Koch’s subjectivity thesis states that without embodied subjects there could be no individual things in space and time. Subjects, argues Koch, are “logico-ontologically” necessary because the problem of an apparent logical antinomy between the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the principle of the non-generality of individuating properties can only be solved by holding that spatiotemporal individuals necessarily have indexical, hence subject-dependent, properties. This article critically examines Koch’s argument and proposes an alternative solution which, being based on individual essences, namely Plantinga’s “α-transforms” of Koch’s weakly individuating indexical properties, does not entail the necessity of subjects. The aim is to show that because of this alternative, Koch’s argument falls short of proving the subjectivity thesis ‐ if its failure is not already due to its two ‘antinomic’ main premises or to the requirements Koch imposes on any proper resolution of their conflict.