Abstract

David Hume provides an account of promises in which the obligation to keep promises is derived, initially, from our common interest. Hume uses this account to criticize social contract theories. Social contract theorists derive the obligation to obey the government from our promises to do so. Hume, on the other hand, argues that, like the obligation to keep promises, the obligation to obey the government is derived from our common interest. Because the two obligations have the same source, one cannot be derived from the other. In this dissertation, I argue that Hume's account of promises provides no adequate explanation of the obligation to keep certain kinds of promises. Included among these kinds is the promise that social contract theorists envision. I conclude that social contract theories survive Hume's criticism since he has not demonstrated that the obligation to obey the social contract promise is derived from our common interest. To make this argument, I begin with an examination of Hume's moral theory in general, and how this theory is applied to promises. Next, I examine many of the salient features of the institution of promises as it exists today. These features include the various forms promises take, features of the parties involved in promises, the rules of promising, and conditions that release promisors from the obligation to keep promises. With these salient features as available tools, I turn to a critical evaluation of Hume's account alongside some other types of accounts. I identify the weakness in his account of promises, and demonstrate how this weakness results in the failure of his criticism of social contract theories.