Reply to Jim Woodward’s Comments on Wolfgang Spohn’s Laws of Belief

Philosophy of Science 86 (4):773-784 (2019)
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Abstract

This is one of a pair of discussion notes comparing some features of the account of causation in Wolfgang Spohn’s Laws of Belief with the “interventionist” account in James Woodward’s Making Things Happen. This note locates the core difference of the accounts in the fact that Woodward’s account follows an epistemological order, while Spohn’s follows a conceptual order. This unfolds in five further differences: type- versus token-level causation, reference to time, actual/counterfactual intervention versus epistemic/suppositional wiggling, a circular versus a circle-free conception of the circumstances of a direct causal relation, and absolute versus model-relative causation.

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Wolfgang Spohn
Universität Konstanz