Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264 (2007)
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Abstract

Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion

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Roy Sorensen
University of Texas at Austin

References found in this work

Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Right and the Good. Some Problems in Ethics.William David Ross - 1930 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Philip Stratton-Lake.

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