How Habits Make Us Virtuous

In Julia Annas, Darcia Narvaez & Nancy E. Snow, Developing the Virtues: Integrating Perspectives. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 135-156 (2016)
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Abstract

Situationists have extended their critique of virtue ethics to practical rationality. They adduce empirical psychological studies to highlight the conflicted nature of conscious and nonconscious processes, arguing that because of this, cognition is too fragmented to support the kind of integrated personality needed to sustain robust virtues. This chapter explores the coordination of these two types of processing in the habits that contribute to virtuous character, thereby countering, at least in part, the situationist view of the fragmented nature of cognition. It also investigates three different paradigms of character formation: the “habits of the folk,” Julia Annas’ account, and Confucian character formation. Each approach combines a different blend of conscious and nonconscious processing in the acquisition of virtue, and all three offer visions of character development that counter the situationist account of the fragmentation of cognitive processes.

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