Contrastive Reasons

New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2017)
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Abstract

Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop.

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Justin Snedegar
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Weighing Reasons.Chris Tucker - 2025 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
When Beliefs Wrong.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):115-127.
Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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