Obligations to animals are not necessarily based on rights

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 8 (2):161-170 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I offer a very qualified argument to the effect that rights are grounded in a certain sort of prejudice that privileges individualistic and perhaps masculinist ways of thinking about moral life. I also propose that we look carefully at other conceptions of social ontology and moral life, including the much discussed care conception.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Obligations to animals are based on rights.Tom Regan - 1995 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 8 (2):171-180.
Animal Rights and Human Needs.Angus Taylor - 1996 - Environmental Ethics 18 (3):249-264.
Mary Wollstonecraft, Children’s Human Rights, and Animal Ethics.Eileen Hunt Botting - 2016 - In Sandrine Bergès & Alan M. S. J. Coffee, The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 92-116.
The Moral Rights of Animals.Mylan Engel & Gary Lynn Comstock (eds.) - 2016 - Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
449 (#114,087)

6 months
6 (#1,502,802)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Deborah Slicer
University of Montana

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations