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Reasons and Persons
Review of Metaphysics 39 (2):370-371 (1985)
Abstract
The aim and result of this book may perhaps be best described as the dissolution of the idea of persons, at least as 'person' is ordinarily understood. Parfit wishes, partly in response to the impersonalism of modern life, to establish impersonalism in moral theory. But such impersonalism will in fact, he maintains, make things go better for persons.Author's Profile
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