Prediction and hindsight as confirmatory evidence

Philosophy of Science 22 (3):227-230 (1955)
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Abstract

The central concept of Carnap's probabilistic theory of induction is a triadic relation, c, the probability or degree of confirmation of the hypothesis, h, on evidence, e. The relation is a purely logical one. The value of c can be computed from a knowledge of h, of e, of the structure of the language, and of the inductive rule to be employed.

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Citations of this work

Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery.Patrick Maher - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):272-285.
Notes on probability and induction.Rudolf Carnap - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):269-298.
Accomodation, prediction, and confirmation.Lee McIntyre - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (3):308-323.

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