Intuitive confidence: Choosing between intuitive and nonintuitive alternatives

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135 (3):409-428 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

People often choose intuitive rather than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. The authors suggest that these intuitive biases arise because intuitions often spring to mind with subjective ease, and the subjective ease leads people to hold their intuitions with high confidence. An investigation of predictions against point spreads found that people predicted intuitive options more often than equally valid nonintuitive alternatives. Critically, though, this effect was largely determined by people's confidence in their intuitions. Across naturalistic, expert, and laboratory samples, against personally determined point spreads, and even when intuitive confidence was manipulated by altering irrelevant aspects of the decision context, the authors found that decreasing intuitive confidence reduced or eliminated intuitive biases. These findings indicate that intuitive biases are not inevitable but rather predictably determined by contextual variables that affect intuitive confidence

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-26

Downloads
49 (#1,198,397)

6 months
11 (#1,043,100)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Simmons
University of Chicago

References found in this work

Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson, The logic of grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co.. pp. 64-75.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton, The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 47.

View all 15 references / Add more references