Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 240 (2013)
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Abstract

I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.

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2012-05-20

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

References found in this work

The origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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